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Encryption built in by device makers

Every device is talking. Someone is recording.

Sensors, meters and controllers carry the data that runs power grids, water systems and factories. Most are too small for the security the rest of the internet relies on. AgilePQ licenses encryption small enough for all of them to the manufacturers who build them.

See what is at stakeTalk to AgilePQ
Connected IoT devices, end of 2025 (forecast)
21.1 billion
On cellular networks
4.5 billion
Qubits now estimated to break RSA-2048
< 1 million
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01Scale

The world runs on small machines.

Meters, pumps, locks, valves and trackers. Built to a price and a power budget, installed for decades, and trusted to report the truth.

21.1billion
connected IoT devices expected by the end of 2025
39billion
forecast for 2030
150million
LoRaWAN devices deployed, growing 25% a year

More than a billion smart meters for electricity, gas and water were installed by the end of 2023, heading for 1.75 billion by 2030. AgilePQ’s field experience is that IoT deployments stay in service for decades. The security they ship with has to last as long as they do.

AgilePQ’s answerEncryption small enough for every one of them

02Exposed

Many are left open. Most are not watched.

Two questions decide the risk: is the data protected, and is anyone watching the device? Measurements of live networks and surveys of the people who run them give the same answer.

38%
of IoT traffic on company networks did not use TLS encryption in Zscaler’s 2023 data
74%
of 650,000 internet-facing MQTT servers, a messaging system small devices use, accept connections from anyone
78%
of industrial network devices Microsoft monitors have known vulnerabilities; many run firmware that can no longer be patched
20%
of industrial organizations Honeywell surveyed continuously monitor connected devices such as cameras and sensors

Only 12.6 percent of industrial organizations in the SANS 2025 survey reported full visibility of an attack’s path through their control systems. Dragos estimates that fewer than 10 percent of operational networks worldwide have meaningful network monitoring. On company networks, Palo Alto Networks found 32.5 percent of devices operating outside IT’s control.

Encryption does not patch a device or change its password. It does keep what the device says private, and makes a forged reading or command fail its check, even on a network nobody is watching.

The trend is improving. In 2019 Zscaler measured more than 90 percent of IoT transactions in plain text; in 2023, 62.1 percent used TLS.

AgilePQ’s answerProtection that travels with every packet

03Real attacks

Attackers already go through the small things.

Not hypotheticals. Each of these is on the public record.

2016Botnet

Mirai

At its peak, 600,000 hijacked connected devices. They knocked Amazon, GitHub, Netflix, PayPal, Reddit and Twitter offline through one DNS provider.

2021Fuel

Colonial Pipeline

All 5,500 miles of pipeline shut down after a ransomware attack. The line carries nearly half the fuel consumed on the US East Coast.

2024State actor

Volt Typhoon

State hackers used end-of-life routers to pre-position inside US critical infrastructure, in some networks for at least five years.

2024China-linked

A 260,000-device botnet

US agencies traced a botnet of hijacked routers, firewalls, storage boxes and other connected devices to a China-based company. In June 2024 it held more than 260,000 devices.

2025Consumer devices

BadBox 2.0

Millions of cheap streaming boxes, projectors, car infotainment units and picture frames were enlisted in a botnet, some infected before they were sold. Google counts more than 10 million.

2025Manufacturing

Jaguar Land Rover

Production stopped for about five weeks. Estimated cost £1.9 billion across more than 5,000 UK organizations.

2025Energy

Wind and solar farms

More than 30 renewable sites and a heat plant serving almost 500,000 customers attacked in Poland, with a purely destructive aim.

2025DDoS

A 31.4-terabit attack

A record attack lasting 35 seconds, from a botnet of an estimated 1 to 4 million infected devices, many of them Android TVs.

2026Botnets

Three million hijacked devices

US, Canadian and German law enforcement disrupted the command servers and other infrastructure of four botnets built from more than three million infected connected devices. Some of their attacks reached about 30 terabits per second, which US prosecutors called record-breaking.

2026Industrial control

Safety alarms switched off

Attackers changed industrial control logic, disabled shutdown and alarm logic, and falsified what operators saw on screen.

2026State actor

Routers turned against their owners

Russian military intelligence stole the credentials of thousands of home and small-office routers, in more than 23 US states, to steal sensitive information. The FBI disrupted the network in April.

2026Water

More than 100 water utilities

In July, CISA saw attacks on internet-exposed systems at more than 100 US water utilities, often controllers on cellular modems. Operators were locked out and boil-water notices followed.

2026Botnets

Another 296,000 devices

Five months after the March takedown, a new botnet, Dysphoria, had compromised about 296,000 connected devices, apparently for DDoS attacks.

Critical systems now depend on devices that were never built to defend themselves.

AgilePQ’s answerEvery message locked on the device and checked on arrival

04The gap

The smallest devices cannot carry the usual protection.

The IETF classes constrained devices by memory. A Class 1 device has about 10 KiB of RAM and 100 KiB of flash, and “cannot easily” run TLS, the protocol that secures the web.

RFC 7228 CLASS 1 DEVICERAM ~ 10 KiBTLS library: 1–36 kBSLiM ~1.5 KBdoes not fitup to 3.5× the RAMFlash ~ 100 KiBTLS library: 20–100 kB, up to all of itSLiM ~10.5 KB full protocol
Device limits from RFC 7228. TLS library range from wolfSSL’s own figures. SLiM from AgilePQ’s 2021 measurements on a 16 MHz Arm Cortex-M0.

A typical embedded TLS library needs 20 to 100 kB of flash and 1 to 36 kB of RAM. On a Class 1 board that is most of the product. So the choice becomes security or features, and security loses.

AgilePQ’s answerAbout 2 KB of code and 1.5 KB of memory

05SLiM

SLiM. Different by design.

SLiM is not AES and not TLS. It is AgilePQ’s own encryption suite for the smallest devices, RFC 7228 Class 0 through Class 2. Every device gets its own keys before it ships. Every packet is locked on the device, with a key state that changes from one packet to the next and a check that makes a changed packet fail.

Message 0001
1 · The messagewhat the device wants to say
2 · Its keysecret, and new for every message
3 · What travelsscrambled: anyone listening sees only this
4 · The check

Unlocked on arrival: “Tank 4: 2.31 bar”

An illustration made in your browser. It shows the idea, not SLiM’s algorithm, and it protects nothing.

< 2KB RAM
about 800 B for the library, 1,500 B for the full protocol
0handshakes
no public-key negotiation on the network: keys are delivered, not negotiated
376bytes
to start a session, against 2,728–3,478 for TLS 1.2
2–10bytes
of overhead per packet, the integrity check included. No padding

Bytes to set up one secure session, drawn to scale

SLiM
376 B
TLS 1.2, self-signed
2,728 B
TLS 1.2, google.com
3,478 B

Not AES

SLiM is AgilePQ’s own cipher, not a block cipher like AES. Data is not padded out to 16- or 32-byte blocks; a packet costs 2 to 10 extra bytes.

No handshake

There is no public-key negotiation on the network to intercept, downgrade or record for later. A session starts with one short request and one encrypted key voucher.

Keyed at the factory

The manufacturer gives every device its own key voucher on the production line. It can be replaced in the field if a device is ever compromised.

A new lock every packet

The key state changes with each packet, so the same reading never looks the same twice, and a recorded packet cannot simply be sent again.

No certificates

Devices are known by the keys the key server issues, not by certificates, so there are none to expire, renew or forge.

Locked end to end

Data stays locked from the device to the server that receives it. Gateways, modems and networks in between carry it without being able to read it.

Measurements are AgilePQ’s own (2019–2021), on the platforms named in the notes. SLiM is not one of NIST’s approved algorithms; the standards page sets out exactly where it stands.

How SLiM worksWhere SLiM stands on the standards

06Built in

Built in at the factory. Carried into every market.

AgilePQ licenses SLiM to device manufacturers. They build it into a product line once, and every device they ship carries it into every market they sell to.

  1. Add the library

    A C library of about 2 KB goes into the device firmware, on chips the maker already uses.

  2. Key every device

    On the production line, each device gets its own key voucher, replaceable in the field.

  3. Run the key server

    The SLiM key server checks each device and issues fresh session keys.

  4. Ship anywhere

    Utilities, government suppliers, network operators and industry: the protection travels with the device.

One integration covers a whole product line. The maker needs no new chip, no certificate authority and no separate design for each market.

Every market the device is sold into inherits the protection.

AgilePQ’s answerWhat a device maker gets

07The quantum clock

Stolen today. Read tomorrow.

Most of the internet’s encryption rests on public-key cryptography: RSA and elliptic curves. A large enough quantum computer breaks both. Nobody has to wait for one. Encrypted traffic can be recorded now and read later.

YEAR2026Q-day: the date nobody can promiseField deviceTLS · RSA / elliptic curveOperatorcontrol room · cloud9F 3A C144 E0 1BB7 15 6D2E 91 D8C6 0A 737D 28 F5copied, not blockedThe archive: stored until it can be read9F 3A C1 07 5E D2 8BTANK 4 · 2.31 BAR44 E0 1B 9C 7A 2F 06GATE 12 · OPENB7 15 6D F3 08 A9 C4VALVE 7 · 34%2E 91 D8 40 7C 5B E3PUMP 3 · 1,480 RPMC6 0A 73 BF 19 E4 52FEED B · 61.2 Hz7D 28 F5 61 AE 0C 97DOOR 9 · UNLOCKED
Encrypted today, with the public-key cryptography the internet runs on.Recorded in transit. Nothing fails, so nobody notices.Readable the day a large enough quantum computer exists.
‘Store now, decrypt later’ attacks are already likely occurring.
European Commission, 2025

The machine keeps getting smaller. In 2019 the best published estimate to break RSA-2048 was 20 million qubits running for eight hours. In 2025 it fell below one million qubits, in under a week. Experts put the odds of such a machine within ten years at 28 to 49 percent.

102103104105106107108NOISY QUBITS · LOG SCALE20 million2019 · 8 hours< 1 million2025 · < 1 week20× fewerLargest error-corrected chip, 2024: 105 qubits

Qubits needed to factor RSA-2048, by estimate. Willow chip.

Run the numbers for your data
AgilePQ’s answerNo public-key step for a quantum computer to break

08The deadlines

The question is no longer whether. It is when.

Governments have moved from guidance to dates. Device makers selling into Europe, suppliers to the US government and operators of critical infrastructure now have deadlines.

  1. 2024

    • AprUK product security law in force for connected devices.UK PSTI
    • AugNIST publishes its first post-quantum standards: FIPS 203, 204, 205.NIST

  2. 2025

    • AugEU radio-equipment cybersecurity rules apply.EU RED
    • AugNIST finalizes Ascon, its lightweight standard for constrained devices.NIST SP 800-232

  3. 2026Today

    • SepEU device makers must report actively exploited vulnerabilities.EU Cyber Resilience Act
    • DecEvery EU member state starts its post-quantum transition.EU roadmap

  4. 2027

    • JanNew US national security system acquisitions must be CNSA 2.0 compliant.NSA
    • DecEU Cyber Resilience Act applies in full: data in transit encrypted by “state of the art mechanisms”.EU Cyber Resilience Act

  5. 2028

    • UK organizations to have migration goals and plans defined.UK NCSC

  6. 2029

    • Google’s own deadline to complete its post-quantum migration.Google

  7. 2030

    • DecUS high-value federal systems must use post-quantum key establishment.Executive Order 14412
    • Constrained devices in national security systems: support and prefer CNSA 2.0.NSA
    • EU high-risk systems migrated. 112-bit RSA and elliptic curve deprecated (NIST draft).EU · NIST

  8. 2031

    • UK highest-priority migrations complete; US federal signatures post-quantum.UK NCSC · EO 14412

  9. 2033

    • Constrained devices in national security systems: CNSA 2.0 exclusively.NSA

  10. 2035

    • US goal: mitigate as much quantum risk as feasible.NSM-10
    • Quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms disallowed (NIST draft). UK migration complete.NIST · UK NCSC

09The market

One integration. Every market the device is sold into.

Every connected product sold in Europe, every federal supplier and every utility network now has to answer the same question about its data in transit. A manufacturer that builds SLiM in answers it once, for every market it sells to.

32.5million
satellite IoT subscribers forecast for 2029, up from 5.8 million in 2024
$7.1billion
to migrate prioritized US federal systems, 2025–2035; hardwired cryptography is “a significant portion”
€15million
or 2.5% of global turnover: the EU’s maximum fine per breach of the essential requirements
4.5billion
cellular IoT connections at the end of 2025, rising to 7.8 billion in 2031
01Device manufacturersBuild SLiM in once. Every device you ship carries it, into every market you sell to.02GovernmentSecrets with a long shelf life, sent from devices that stay in the field for years.03Network operatorsA fraction of a TLS handshake on links where every byte costs airtime.04Utilities and critical infrastructureMeters, pumps and sensors that outlive the cryptography they shipped with.

10The mission

Secure the last mile.

Every device that carries data the world depends on should be able to protect it. That is the work.

“The world is better for everyone when information is secure.”

Talk to AgilePQInvestor relations

11Sources

Sources and notes62 sources · 12 from AgilePQ’s own records
  1. 1RFC 7228: Class 1 devices “cannot easily talk to other Internet nodes employing a full protocol stack such as using HTTP, Transport Layer Security (TLS), and related security protocols”.IETF RFC 7228, section 3.Sourced
  2. 2AgilePQ licenses SLiM to device manufacturers, who build it into their products and take it into the markets they sell to.AgilePQ management (October 2026).AgilePQ record
  3. 3IoT Analytics: connected IoT devices “expected to grow 14% year-over-year to 21.1 billion by the end of 2025” and “estimated to reach 39 billion in 2030”.IoT Analytics, Number of connected IoT devices (28 October 2025).Sourced
  4. 4Ericsson: “Total cellular IoT connections reached around 4.5 billion at the end of 2025”, forecast to reach 7.8 billion in 2031.Ericsson Mobility Report, IoT connections outlook (June 2026).Sourced
  5. 5Gidney: “a 2048 bit RSA integer could be factored in less than a week by a quantum computer with less than a million noisy qubits” (same hardware assumptions as 2019).C. Gidney, arXiv:2505.15917 (21 May 2025).Sourced
  6. 6LoRa Alliance: “LoRaWAN-connected devices have reached 150 million globally, growing at a rate of 25% CAGR.”LoRa Alliance press release (22 September 2026); the alliance’s own count.Sourced
  7. 7IoT Analytics: “By the end of 2023, 1.06 billion smart meters (electricity, water and gas) have been installed worldwide”; the installed base “is expected to exceed 1.75 billion by 2030 (CAGR 6%)”.IoT Analytics, smart electricity meter market 2024 (21 February 2024).Sourced
  8. 8AgilePQ’s 2020 white paper says IoT deployments may remain in the field for over 15 years; AgilePQ now describes that service life as decades.AgilePQ, SLiM Security for Cellular, Satellite, and Constrained Networks (2020), page 3.AgilePQ record
  9. 9Zscaler ThreatLabz: “62.1% of IoT transactions now use TLS/SSL encryption, far more than the 17% in our previous report.” The remaining 37.9% did not use TLS; that subtraction is AgilePQ’s. The data is enterprise traffic through Zscaler’s cloud.Zscaler ThreatLabz, 2023 Enterprise IoT and OT Threat Report (October 2023).Sourced
  10. 10Censys: “over 650,000 hosts expose one or more MQTT services”; “Of these, more than 480,000 (approx. 74%) accept unauthenticated connections from any client”. MQTT is a messaging protocol widely used by small connected devices.Censys, Unauthenticated Message Queues are a Problem (6 January 2026).Sourced
  11. 11Microsoft: “78% of industrial network devices on customer networks monitored by Microsoft Defender for IoT have known vulnerabilities.” “Among these, 46% utilize deprecated firmware, for which patches are no longer available, while the remaining 32% operate outdated systems with unpatched vulnerabilities.”Microsoft Security blog (30 May 2024), citing the Microsoft Digital Defense Report 2023.Sourced
  12. 12Honeywell, from a survey of more than 600 industrial cybersecurity leaders: “only 21% reported having a complete inventory of their OT assets”, “while only 20% continuously monitor connected IoT devices such as cameras and sensors”. Honeywell sells OT security services.Honeywell 2026 OT Security Benchmark Report, press release (22 September 2026).Sourced
  13. 13SANS Institute, from more than 330 industrial cybersecurity professionals: “Only 12.6 percent reported full ICS Cyber Kill Chain visibility”.SANS 2025 State of ICS/OT Security survey, press release (19 November 2025).Sourced
  14. 14Dragos: “Dragos estimates that fewer than 10 percent of OT networks worldwide currently have meaningful network monitoring in place.” It is Dragos’s estimate, not a measurement.Dragos, OT Threat Landscape 2026 (24 March 2026), drawing on its 2026 Year in Review.Sourced
  15. 15Palo Alto Networks, from “over 27 million connected devices belonging to 1,803 enterprise network customers”: “A full 32.5% of all devices in corporate networks operate outside IT control.” “nearly 39% of IT devices registered in Active Directory lack an active EDR or XDR.”Palo Alto Networks, 2025 Device Security Threat Report blog (28 October 2025).Sourced
  16. 16Zscaler (May 2019), from 56 million IoT device transactions over 30 days: “over 90 percent of IoT transactions are occurring over a plain text channel”.Zscaler press release (22 May 2019).Sourced
  17. 17Mirai reached “a peak of 600,000 infections at the end of November 2016”. On 21 October 2016 it attacked Dyn, a DNS provider, disrupting sites including Amazon, GitHub, Netflix, PayPal, Reddit and Twitter.Antonakakis et al., Understanding the Mirai Botnet, USENIX Security 2017.Sourced
  18. 18Colonial Pipeline’s CEO testified that after the May 2021 ransomware attack “all 5,500 miles of pipelines had been shut down”; the line “accounts for nearly half of the fuel consumed on the East Coast”.Joseph Blount, testimony to the US Senate Homeland Security Committee (8 June 2021).Sourced
  19. 19CISA, NSA and FBI: Volt Typhoon is “pre-positioning themselves on IT networks to enable the disruption of OT functions across multiple critical infrastructure sectors”, with access maintained in some environments “for at least five years”, using “end-of-life SOHO routers”.CISA advisory AA24-038A (7 February 2024).Sourced
  20. 20FBI, Cyber National Mission Force and NSA: PRC-linked actors compromised “SOHO routers, firewalls, network-attached storage (NAS) and Internet of Things (IoT) devices”; “As of June 2024, the botnet consisted of over 260,000 devices.” The advisory names Integrity Technology Group, a PRC-based company.Joint advisory, People’s Republic of China-Linked Actors Compromise Routers and IoT Devices for Botnet Operations (18 September 2024).Sourced
  21. 21FBI: “The BADBOX 2.0 botnet consists of millions of infected devices”, among them “TV streaming devices, digital projectors, aftermarket vehicle infotainment systems, digital picture frames and other products”; criminals work by “configuring the product with malicious software prior to the users purchase” or during set-up. Google: “The Badbox 2.0 botnet compromised over 10 million uncertified devices”.FBI public service announcement I-060525-PSA (5 June 2025); Google (17 July 2025).Sourced
  22. 22The Cyber Monitoring Centre estimated the Jaguar Land Rover incident at £1.9 billion, affecting more than 5,000 UK organizations: “the most economically damaging cyber event to hit the UK”. “Vehicle production was suspended for approximately five weeks.”Cyber Monitoring Centre statement (22 October 2025).Sourced
  23. 23CERT Polska: attacks on more than 30 wind and solar farms and a heat plant serving almost 500,000 customers; “All attacks had a purely destructive objective.”CERT Polska incident report (30 January 2026).Sourced
  24. 24Cloudflare: “In 2025, we mitigated a 31.4 Tbps DDoS attack lasting 35 seconds. The source was the Aisuru-Kimwolf botnet, including many infected Android TVs.” Its Q4 2025 report: “The botnet comprises an estimated 1-4 million infected hosts.”Cloudflare (10 April 2026); Cloudflare 2025 Q4 DDoS threat report (5 February 2026).Sourced
  25. 25US Department of Justice: a court-authorized operation, alongside “law enforcement actions conducted in Canada and Germany”, disrupted infrastructure “used by the Aisuru, KimWolf, JackSkid and Mossad Internet of Things (IoT) botnets”; “As of March 2026, the number of infected devices hijacked worldwide by the botnet administrators exceeded three million”; “Some of these attacks measured approximately 30 Terabits per second, which were record-breaking attacks”.US Attorney’s Office, District of Alaska (19 March 2026).Sourced
  26. 26FBI, CISA and partners: attackers manipulated “data displayed on human machine interface (HMI) and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) displays”; in an update, “the changes disabled critical shutdown and alarm logic … allowing systems to enter unsafe conditions without notifying operators”.Joint advisory AA26-097A (7 April 2026) and its update (22 July 2026).Sourced
  27. 27US Department of Justice: “Since at least 2024, GRU actors have exploited known vulnerabilities to steal credentials for thousands of TP-Link routers worldwide.” The FBI said the GRU “weaponized routers owned by unsuspecting Americans in more than 23 states” to steal sensitive information. A court-authorized operation disrupted the network.US Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs (7 April 2026).Sourced
  28. 28CISA: “In July 2026, CISA observed malicious cyber activity targeting internet-exposed systems at more than 100 Water and Wastewater Systems (WWS) Sector entities, commonly via programmable logic controllers (PLCs) connected directly to a cellular modem.” “Threat actors targeting exposed PLCs have modified passwords to lock out operators … This activity has resulted in boil water notices and sustained manual operations.”CISA, Internet Exposure Reduction Guidance; CISA alert (30 July 2026).Sourced
  29. 29Minnesota IT Services: attackers “targeted operational technology at more than 30 Minnesota community water systems” on 26–27 July 2026.Minnesota IT Services (28 July 2026).Sourced
  30. 30Shadowserver Foundation: “This Special Report contains information about ~296,000 devices compromised by the Dysphoria botnet.” “Dysphoria targets IoT devices and its primary function appears to be for use in DDoS-attacks.”Shadowserver, Dysphoria Botnet Special Report (last updated 13 August 2026).Sourced
  31. 31RFC 7228 sets Class 0 at much less than 10 KiB of RAM and 100 KiB of code, Class 1 at about 10 KiB and 100 KiB, and Class 2 at about 50 KiB and 250 KiB.IETF RFC 7228, Terminology for Constrained-Node Networks, section 3, Table 1 (May 2014).Sourced
  32. 32wolfSSL describes its embedded TLS library as having a “minimum footprint size of 20-100 kB, depending on build options and operating environment” and “runtime memory usage between 1-36 kB”.wolfSSL product page (vendor’s own figures), accessed October 2026.Sourced
  33. 33AgilePQ designed SLiM’s cipher for RFC 7228 Class 0 through Class 2 devices.AgilePQ cipher design paper (internal draft, 2021), section 2.1.AgilePQ record
  34. 34SLiM is symmetric end to end. A key server gives each device its own keys and issues session keys; the encryption changes with every packet. SLiM uses no RSA or elliptic-curve key exchange.AgilePQ, SLiM Overview v2.4 (April 2021) and SLiM Technical Overview v2.4.9 (January 2024).AgilePQ record
  35. 35AgilePQ: “Keys are changed with each packet transmitted”; “Encrypted messages are different always, even if the plaintext remains the same”; “Replay of messages is prevented.” Session keys are discarded when the device or server disconnects.AgilePQ, Cryptography Review (October 2018).AgilePQ record
  36. 36SLiM does not pad data to 16- or 32-byte blocks; per-packet overhead is 2 to 10 bytes depending on mode, including an integrity check. AgilePQ: SLiM “adds a 10-byte header per packet (which includes an integrity check)”.AgilePQ engineering documentation (2021); AgilePQ, SLiM byte savings (23 April 2021).AgilePQ record
  37. 37AgilePQ measured about 800 bytes of RAM for the standalone SLiM library and about 1,500 bytes for the full protocol, on a 16 MHz Arm Cortex-M0 compiled at -O3.AgilePQ engineering benchmarks (July 2021).AgilePQ record
  38. 38AgilePQ measured 376 bytes to set up a SLiM session (44 sent, 332 received), against 2,728 bytes (self-signed certificate) and 3,478 bytes (google.com) for an OpenSSL TLS 1.2 handshake, on a Raspberry Pi 3.AgilePQ engineering benchmarks (April and July 2021).AgilePQ record
  39. 39AgilePQ: “The most common way is to have the device manufacturer provision the device.” Devices are “programmed directly by the manufacturer with a unique device voucher”, which “can be replaced in the field at any time in the future if a device’s keys become compromised.” Devices can also be provisioned in the field by a provisioning server on first power-up.AgilePQ, Cryptography Review (October 2018).AgilePQ record
  40. 40AgilePQ measured a compiled size of 2,134 bytes for the standalone SLiM library and 10,522 bytes for the full protocol on the same Arm Cortex-M0 build.AgilePQ engineering benchmarks (July 2021).AgilePQ record
  41. 41AgilePQ has run SLiM as a C library on microcontrollers and modules including Silicon Labs EFR32/EFM32, TI MSP430, CC1310, CC2640 and CC3220, Nordic, Espressif ESP32, Dialog DA14585, Raspberry Pi and Cisco 809/819, over BLE, Wi-Fi, LoRaWAN, Sigfox, NB-IoT, LTE-M, 2G–4G and satellite links.AgilePQ test platform list (2021).AgilePQ record
  42. 42CISA, NSA and NIST: “cyber actors could target our nation’s most sensitive information now and leverage future quantum computing technology”, a threat “particularly devastating to sensitive information with long-term secrecy requirements”.NSA press release on the joint Quantum-Readiness fact sheet (21 August 2023).Sourced
  43. 43European Commission: “‘Store now, decrypt later’ attacks are already likely occurring.”European Commission, Post-Quantum Cryptography policy page (June 2025).Sourced
  44. 44Gidney and Ekerå estimated that RSA-2048 could be factored in 8 hours with 20 million noisy qubits.C. Gidney, M. Ekerå, How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers in 8 hours using 20 million noisy qubits, arXiv:1905.09749 (2019); Quantum 5, 433 (2021).Sourced
  45. 45Global Risk Institute survey of 26 experts: a quantum computer able to factor RSA-2048 in under 24 hours is “quite possible (28-49%) within the next 10 years” and “likely (51-70%) in the next 15”.Global Risk Institute, Quantum Threat Timeline Report (2025 survey, published March 2026).Sourced
  46. 46Google’s 105-qubit Willow chip demonstrated error correction “below threshold”: “being able to drive errors down while scaling up the number of qubits.”Google (9 December 2024).Sourced
  47. 47Berg Insight: “The global satellite IoT subscriber base grew to surpass 5.8 million in 2024.” Subscribers will grow at a CAGR of 41.1 percent “to reach 32.5 million units in 2029.”Berg Insight, The Satellite IoT Communications Market, 5th edition (September 2025).Sourced
  48. 48The White House: the cost of migrating prioritized federal information systems to post-quantum cryptography “between 2025 and 2035 will be approximately $7.1 billion in 2024 dollars”; replacing systems with cryptography hardwired into hardware or firmware is “a significant portion of the overall estimate”.Report on Post-Quantum Cryptography (July 2024); excludes national security systems.Sourced
  49. 49EU Cyber Resilience Act: applies from 11 December 2027, with reporting of actively exploited vulnerabilities from 11 September 2026. Products must “protect the confidentiality of stored, transmitted or otherwise processed data … such as by encrypting relevant data at rest or in transit by state of the art mechanisms”. Fines reach EUR 15 000 000 or 2.5% of worldwide annual turnover, whichever is higher.Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Article 71(2), Annex I Part I (2)(e), Article 64(2).Sourced
  50. 50AgilePQ’s vision: “The world is better for everyone when information is secure.” Its mission: “AgilePQ visibly secures IoT devices worldwide.”AgilePQ.AgilePQ record
  51. 51The UK’s Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure regulations “come into force on 29th April 2024”.The Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure (Security Requirements for Relevant Connectable Products) Regulations 2023, SI 2023/1007.Sourced
  52. 52NIST approved its first three post-quantum standards in August 2024: FIPS 203 (ML-KEM, key establishment), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA, signatures) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA, hash-based signatures). They are public-key algorithms.Federal Register 2024-17956 (effective 14 August 2024).Sourced
  53. 53The EU Radio Equipment Directive cybersecurity requirements (Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/30) apply from 1 August 2025, with harmonised standards EN 18031-1, -2 and -3.Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/138 (28 January 2025).Sourced
  54. 54NIST SP 800-232 standardizes the Ascon family (Ascon-AEAD128, Ascon-Hash256, Ascon-XOF128, Ascon-CXOF128) for constrained devices, “a viable alternative when the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) may not perform optimally”.NIST SP 800-232, final (13 August 2025).Sourced
  55. 55EU roadmap: “By 31.12.2026: At least the First Steps have been implemented by all Member States”; by 31.12.2030 the transition for high-risk use cases is completed; by 2035 medium-risk is completed and low-risk completed as far as feasible.Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography, v1.1 (June 2025).Sourced
  56. 56NSA: “by January 1, 2027, all new acquisitions for NSS will be required to be CNSA 2.0 compliant unless otherwise noted”; symmetric encryption is AES with “256-bit keys for all classification levels”.NSA, CNSA 2.0 FAQ v2.1 (December 2024).Sourced
  57. 57UK NCSC milestones: by 2028 define migration goals and plan; by 2031 complete the highest-priority migrations; by 2035 “Complete migration to PQC of all your systems, services and products”.NCSC, PQC migration timelines (20 March 2025).Sourced
  58. 58Google: “We’re setting a timeline for post-quantum cryptography migration to 2029.” “The threat to encryption is relevant today with store-now-decrypt-later attacks.”Google (25 March 2026).Sourced
  59. 59Executive Order 14412 directs agencies to “transition all HVAs and high impact systems to use PQC for key establishment by December 31, 2030” and for digital signatures by 31 December 2031, and calls for a rule requiring covered contractors “to comply by December 31, 2030, with NIST’s FIPS, including all applicable FIPS incorporating PQC compliant algorithms.”Executive Order 14412, Securing the Nation Against Advanced Cryptographic Attacks (22 June 2026; Federal Register 2026-12909).Sourced
  60. 60NSA CNSA 2.0: “Niche equipment (e.g., constrained devices, large public-key infrastructure systems): support and prefer CNSA 2.0 by 2030, and exclusively use CNSA 2.0 by 2033.” “NSA expects the transition to QR algorithms for NSS to be complete by 2035.”NSA, Announcing the Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0 (September 2022).Sourced
  61. 61NIST’s draft transition plan marks RSA and elliptic-curve algorithms at 112-bit strength “Deprecated after 2030” and quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms “Disallowed after 2035”. It is still an initial public draft.NIST IR 8547 ipd, Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards (12 November 2024).Sourced
  62. 62National Security Memorandum 10 sets the goal “of mitigating as much of the quantum risk as is feasible by 2035”.NSM-10 (4 May 2022), via govinfo.Sourced